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librium exists in a two-stage location-price game when the curvature of the
transportation cost function is sufficiently high. One important point is that
not all of these equilibria are at maximal differentiation. In this paper we
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the city. The magnitude of this effect depends on the bargaining power of the
unions.
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Hotelling’s (1929) article was the starting point of an intense discussion on optimal
location in a heterogenous product space. Hotelling claimed that firms will locate in the
middle of a linear city to cover a hinterland as large as possible. Many authors criticised
the principle of minimal differentiation (for early contributions see Lerner and Singer 1937
or Smithies 1941), others supported Hotelling’s view (for example Chamberlin 1948). Only
in 1979, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse have shown that Hotelling’s argument is
invalid, because a pure strategy price equilibrium does not exist in his case. They slightly
transformed the model by introducing quadratic instead of linear transportation costs and
got a reversed result in a two stage game: maximum differentiation. In an article published
in Economics Letters, Economides (1986) analyzed a family of transportation cost functions
where the linear and the quadratic function are special cases. He was able to derive regions
in the parameter space where pure strategy price equilibria exist and some location equilibria
do not exhibit maximum differentiation (minimum differentiation is never an equilibrium).
In this short note the Economides paper is extended to a three stage game, including a
wage bargaining stage. In stage 1 two firms simultaneously choose their location in a linear
city. In stage 2, given the location of the firms, both firms bargain with their firm unions
on the wage rate (decentralized wage bargaining) and in the last stage, given location and
wages, firms set prices simultaneously.
Assume firm a is located on the left and firm b on the right side of a linear city with the
length of 1. 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1
2
. a describes the distance between firm a and the left corner, and
b the distance between firm b and the right corner. Consumer x is indifferent to buy from
firm a or b, if
p1 + |x− a|
γ = p2 + |1− b− x|
γ (1)
with 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2. We get Hotelling’s case with γ = 1 where a pure strategy price equilibrium
does not exist.1 The quadratic transportation costs case is included with γ = 2.
Analyzing only symmetric solutions, Economides has shown that in equilibrium the
indifferent consumer x will be between a and 1 − b. Using this information we are able to
isolate ∂x
∂pi
by differentiating (1) with respect to p1, respectively to p2.
∂x
∂p1
= −
1
γ [(x− a)γ−1 + (1− b− x)γ−1]
= −
∂x
∂p2
(2)
All consumers have unit demands and the gross surplus is high enough for them to buy.
Firms’ price decisions only determine market shares, not the overall sale. Demand for firm
1 is given by D1 = x(p1, p2) and for firm 2 by D2 = 1 − x(p1, p2). Assuming a simple
production technology with one unit of labor (the only input) producing one unit of output,
profit can be written as pii = (pi −wi)Di. Substituting (2) into the first order conditions of
the profit maximizing problem results in
pi − wi = γDi
[
(x− a)γ−1 + (1− b− x)γ−1
]
(3)
pi∗i = γDi
2
[
(x− a)γ−1 + (1− b− x)γ−1
]
(4)
Substituting (3) into (1) and using abbreviations A = (x − a)γ−1 + (1 − b − x)γ−1 and
B = (x− a)γ−2 − (1− b− x)γ−2 we can implicitly characterize the price equilibrium (stage
1 Osborne and Pitchik (1987) have calculated the equilibrium of Hotelling’s location game numerically
allowing for mixed strategy price equilibrium in the second stage. In the preceding location game firms
choose a, respectively b around 0.27.
1
3 of our model) by
G(x, a, b, w1, w2) ≡ γ(2x− 1)A + (x− a)
γ − (1− b− x)γ + w1 − w2 = 0 (5)
Wage Bargaining (Stage 2)
We present the wage bargaining process as a right to manage model with decentralized
wage setting.2 The objective function of the union3 is (wi−w)Li(wi), the objective function
of the firm is the profit.
The Nash products to be maximized are given by
Ni = [(wi − w)Di(wi)]
β
[(pi − wi)Di(wi)]
1−β , (6)
with β being the bargaining power of the unions. We describe a symmetric situation, with
a common bargaining power for both unions. Note that with β = 0 we have a competitive
labor market, equivalent to the model of Economides (1986).
In a right to manage model the union and the firm negotiate over wages only and the
firm owner can unilaterally set the employment level in the next stage. To represent this
structure we have to take into account that the price will depend on the negotiated wage
rate. The outcome of the bargaining can be described by the solution of the following
equations.
dNi
dwi
= 0 (7)
For firm 1 we get
β
[
x + (w1 − w)
dx
dw1
]
(p1−w1)x+(1−β)(w1−w)x
[(
dp1
dw1
− 1
)
x + (p1 − w1)
dx
dw1
]
= 0 (8)
From (3) we know that p1 = γxA + w1.
dp1
dw1
= γ
[
dx
dw1
A + x
dA
dw1
]
+ 1 = γ (A + (γ − 1)xB)
dx
dw1
+ 1 (9)
Substituting (3) and (9) into (8) we can derive
(w1 − w) = −
βxA
[(2− β)A + (1− β)(γ − 1)xB] dx
dw1
(10)
Equivalently, we can derive from the first order condition of the wage bargaining in
firm 2
(w2 − w) =
β(1− x)A
[(2− β)A− (1− β)(γ − 1)(1− x)B] dx
dw2
(11)
2 For a discussion on the right to manage model versus an efficient bargaining see Booth (1995). The
cooperative bargaining solution was introduced by Nash (1950).
3 With this presentation the union tries to maximize the difference between the expected utility of
the representative member and his/her disagreement utility, given the labor force is normalized to one and
disagreement utility of the representative union member is the reservation wage (w).
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The next step is to isolate the effect of a marginal change in a firm’s location on the
indifferent consumer. As an intermediate step we have to calculate the marginal effect of a
wage change on this consumer. Using the characterization of the price equilibrium (5) and
the implicit function rule, we can derive dx/dwi.
dx
dw1
= −
1
γ [3A + (2x− 1)(γ − 1)B]
(12)
and the equivalent manipulation for w2 results in
dx
dw2
= −
dx
dw1
Substituting these results into (10) and (11), we can derive
w1 − w =
βγxA [3A + (2x− 1)(γ − 1)B]
(2− β)A + x(1− β)(γ − 1)B
(13)
w2 − w =
βγ(1− x)A [3A + (2x− 1)(γ − 1)B]
(2− β)A− (1− x)(1− β)(γ − 1)B
(14)
Finally, the derivative of x with respect to a is given by
dx
da
= −
∂G/∂a
∂G/∂x
(15)
where
∂G
∂x
= γ
(
3A + (2x− 1)
∂A
∂x
)
+
∂w1
∂x
−
∂w2
∂x
(16)
and
∂G
∂a
= γ(2x− 1)
∂A
∂a
− γ(x− a)γ−1 +
∂w1
∂a
−
∂w2
∂a
. (17)
Terms ∂wi
∂x
and ∂wi
∂a
can be calculated from (13) and (14).
Choice of location (Stage 1)
In stage 1 firms can freely choose their locations. For firm 1 using (4) the first order
condition of this problem is given by
dpi1
da
=
∂pi1
∂a
+
∂pi1
∂x
dx
da
= γx2
∂A
∂a
+ γ
(
2xA + x2
∂A
∂x
)
dx
da
= 0
⇒ −(γ − 1)x(x− a)γ−2 + (2A + (γ − 1)xB)
dx
da
= 0
(18)
Evaluating this expression for symmetric locations(
x = 1
2
, a = b, A = 2
(
1
2
− a
)γ−1
, B = 0
)
, we get
−
(γ − 1)
2
(
1
2
− a
)γ−2
+ 4
(
1
2
− a
)γ−1
dx
da
= 0 (19)
dx
da
is an unhandy term. Evaluated for symmetric locations, we get
3
dx
da
= −
−γ
(
1
2
− a
)γ−1
+
3βγ(γ−1)
2−β
[(
1
2
− a
)γ−2
+
(1−β)(γ−2)( 1
2
−a)
γ−3
2(2−β)
]
6γ
(
1
2
− a
)γ−1
+ 12βγ
2−β
[(
1
2
− a
)γ−1
−
(1−β)(γ−1)(γ−2)( 1
2
−a)
γ−3
4(2−β)
] (20)
Consider the extreme cases β = 0 (competitive labor market) and β = 1 (monopoly
union) the expression becomes easily manageable.
Competitive labor market: Substituting β = 0 into dpi1
da
and solving for a, results in
a =
5− 3γ
4
(21)
with an interior solution for γ < 5
3
. This is exactly the result of Economides (1986).
With β = 0 his and our model differ only in the inclusion of constant marginal costs. The
price setting stage is exactly the same in both models, we can conclude that a pure strategy
price equilibrium exists for the range 2 ≥ γ ≥ 1.26 (see Economides 1986, Proposition 2)
and the wage setting and the location games are properly defined.
Monopoly union: Now let us analyze the case of an extraordinarily strong union.
Substituting β = 1 into dpi1
da
and solving for a, we get
a =
23− 21γ
4
(22)
The solution would be an interior one, if γ < 23
21
. However in this case, as mentioned above,
a pure strategy price equilibrium does not exist. Thus, for all values of γ where a pure
strategy price equilibrium exists, product differentiation is maximal when wages are set by
monopoly unions in a decentralized environment.
Intermediate case: With an intermediate strong union, the optimal location is the
nearer to the extreme points, the stronger the union is (the higher β). Figure 1 shows the
optimal a depending on the bargaining power for γ = 1.3 (solid line) and γ = 1.4 (dashed
line).
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With β > 0.4 we get maximum differentiation for both values of γ. With γ = 1.3 we get
an inner solution for β’s between around 0.23 and 0.4.
Tirole (1988, Chap.7) argues that two opposite effects are at work. The market share
effect as emphasized by Hotelling is pushing the firms to the center of the city, while a large
distance to the competitor allows a firm to increase its price (the strategic effect) and gives
firms an incentive to move to the borders4. The significance of this strategic effect increases
with the bargaining power of the unions. With decentralized wage bargaining, the marginal
change of demand caused by a marginal change in wage (12) is negative. This effect is
stronger in regions where price competition is very high, which is in the middle of the city5
(with γ = 1 this effect is zero, but then a pure price strategy does not exist). A unilaterally
changing wage has a stronger negative impact on profits in the center than at the borders
of the city. That is why the higher the bargaining power of the unions the more firms tend
to locate at the borders of the city.
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